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It’s a Monday morning of a hot summer day in Budapest. A well-dressed, old lady 
climbs the stairs of the Trolley Bus 75, in the centre of Pest. She sits besides another 
woman, also well-dressed, in her early forties. A polite conversation starts about the hot 
weather and the catastrophes that it causes. When the younger lady observes that 
Hungary, in general, has very favourable climate conditions, her interlocutor abruptly 
replies: 
 
“Yes, this is why so many nations envy us!” 
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“Why, is it because we recovered from so many tragedies and 
catastrophes?” 
 
“No, I mean Hungary has always been attacked because our forefather 
Árpád had a perfect choice with this country. This is why Hungary fought 
through so many centuries, and this is why many people died and Hungary 
got divided. This beautiful huge country, just imagine how beautiful it 
was! [and then] Trianon came” 
  
“Mmmmm, mmmm” 
 
“And this country is a total disaster since then! They took away what they 
could […]” 
 
More than ninety years have passed since the Treaty of Trianon (1920), which left 
Hungary with less than a third of its original territory and about 3.3 million ethnic 
Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries of then Romania, Czechoslovakia, and 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Yet, Trianon and the idea of Great Hungary 
are far from being relics of the past. They can commonly surface in daily conversations, 
enter the political debate, or even find expressions in artistic installations, like the 
controversial giant carpet inaugurated in January 2011, in Brussels, to mark Hungary’s 
EU rotating presidency, featuring among others a map of Great Hungary.1  
Trianon is still present in Hungarian collective consciousness because since then – 
the argument simplistically goes – the borders of the country no longer match the borders 
of the nation. This certainly is not a unique case in the world. Yet, we contend that to pay 
attention to the ways in which the notion of Great Hungary was discursively constructed 
allows for a perspective on geopolitics different from the one traditionally encountered in 
the Anglo-American geopolitical traditions. In the case of Hungary, geopolitics – and, in 
particular, its environmental determinist variant – was not deployed as a tool of 
imperialism and territorial expansionism, but as a discourse legitimizing the existing 
borders of the state. In other words, it was not outward, but inward oriented, resembling 
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in some aspects the ways it featured in another minor geopolitical tradition (Hepple, 
1986). Here below we shall briefly look into the Hungarian geopolitical tradition to 
substantiate this point. 
On the eve of the Trianon peace talks, a group of Hungarian academics published 
an appeal to the negotiators for preserving the territorial unity of Great Hungary (Polner 
et al., 1918). Their main argument was “the so-called principle of geopolitics 
(geopolitika)”, according to which stable states’ formation relies on areas which belong 
together geographically and thus are interconnected economically. Only states based on 
permanent natural circumstances can survive throughout history, whereas “national 
belonging” (i.e. the principle of nationality) can only provide an “intellectual connection” 
which will never be permanent. Thus, on the table of the peace conference – the authors 
claimed – “we should not lay the map of nationalities, but the oro- and hydrographic 
map” (Polner et al., 1918: 10, 14-15).  
The construction of Great Hungary as a geographical unity defined by the natural 
borders of the Carpathian basin had already come to the fore in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, thanks in particular to the work of János Hunfalvy (1863-1865), the 
father of Hungarian geographical science and founder of the Hungarian Geographical 
Society (1872). Yet, in the years before and after Trianon, Hungarian geographers gave 
further substance to this idea as a way to defend first and to reclaim later the territorial 
unity of the country. According to one of the main experts on the history of Hungarian 
geography, it was indeed during the preparation for the peace process at Versailles when 
modern Hungarian geography developed (Hajdú, 2000; Hajdú, 2001). Relying on the 
organicism of Carl Ritter and Friedrich Ratzel, eclectically mixed with ideas from Paul 
Vidal de la Blache, Elisée Reclus, Jean Brunhes, Eduard Suess, and William Morris 
Davis – all used to justify the importance of natural factors in shaping socio-economic 
life – Hungarian geographers produced a vast scholarship aimed at one single aim: to 
demonstrate the natural, organic unity of Great Hungary. Attempts were also made to 
convince foreign readers of such a unity, like the edited book by one of the most 
influential Hungarian geographers of the time, Lajos Lóczy (1918), translated in German 
and Croatian (English, French and Italian editions were also planned, but at the end could 
not be published) (Hajdú, 2000). The Hungarian Geographical Society (1918) also 
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published an appeal to “the geographical societies of the world”, and in particular to the 
ones of the victorious powers of World War I, defending once again the indivisibility of 
Great Hungary on the basis of the organic unity which people form with their natural 
habitat, irrespective of their ethnic and linguistic differences. To capture this organic 
unity, the notion of Lebensraum was at times also used, like in the case of the works of 
two of the most prominent Hungarian geographers of the interwar period – Gyula Prinz 
and Pál Teleki (the latter became Prime Minister twice, in 1920-21 and in 1939-41). Yet, 
this notion was adopted in relation to the internal space of the country, without any 
reference to the state’s territorial growth – Great Hungary indeed as “a separate 
Lebensraum” (Prinz and Teleki, 1937: 30). While in the neighbouring countries, the 
notion of race was also increasingly used to support geopolitical discourses (Bassin 
1987), it did not play a significant role in Hungarian geopolitics. Although there were 
clear references to the existence of a Hungarian race (Lóczy, 1918: 137-147) and the 
need for its protection (Kalmár 1942: 15-18), overall Great Hungary was not constructed 
in ethno-racial terms (Bartucz, 1938). This would have obviously questioned the unity of  
the country, although in 1920 Pál Teleki published for the peace talks in Versailles his 
ethnography map (Figure 1), showing the impossibility to draw clear ethno-cultural 
borders within Great Hungary. Rather than race, it was instead the notion of a unified 
orographic and hydrographic basin which constantly featured in the geopolitical 
discourses about Great Hungary: “Nature marked the borders of the Hungarian state as 
expressive, as sharply, that it does not need artificial delimitation, or red lines on maps, it 
can be recognized without them, exactly because it is not the outcome of human power 
relations, but of natural development” (Polner et al., 1918: 20) (Figure 3). The fact that 
the boundaries of the state only slightly changed since the time Árpád entered the 
Carpathian Basin and founded the first Hungarian state (895 A.D.) was a historical 
reference also frequently used to support the indivisibility of Great Hungary in name of 
‘one-thousand-years-old borders’. 
After World War II, Trianon, Great Hungary and the fate of the so-called ‘over-
border Hungarians’ were passed under silence (Ablonczy, 2007). These were to return 
again as central topics of the domestic political debate after the regime change, often 
exploited for electoral purposes by the conservative party Fidesz. Under its governments, 
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a series of legal measures were adopted (status law, citizenship law, and electoral law), 
all aimed at empowering the rights of over-border Hungarians. Moreover in 2011, the 
Fidesz government promulgated the new Constitution, whose article D expressly 
acknowledges “the ideal of a unified Hungarian nation” and reiterates Hungary’s 
“responsibility for the destiny of Hungarians living outside her borders” – a principle 
already codified into the Hungarian constitution after the regime change.  
Besides these political and juridical acts, today the idea of Great Hungary continues 
to be present in various aspects of everyday life. T-shirts, pins, refrigerator magnets, 
posters, key-holders, mugs, bumper-stickers, wrist-bands, football scarfs, pillow cases, 
and puzzles are among the most common and banal (Billig, 1995) items displaying the 
image of Great Hungary (Figure 2-3). This obviously points to its commodification – its 
exploitation for commercial purposes, besides for electoral interests. Labelling food, 
clothes, and other products as coming from the ‘over-border-territories’ is a popular 
marketing strategy nowadays. This was also true during the interwar period, when the 
political rhetoric condemning Trianon found expression not only in official 
commemorations, monuments, and the changing of street toponyms to remember the 
‘lost’ territories (Borbély Bartis and Borbély Bartis, 2009); but also in countless everyday 
objects: lockets, plates, soda bottles, ashtrays, pencil boxes, postcards, wall carpets, 
children board-games, cards, etc. (Figure 4) (Zeidler, 2002). 
According to a survey administered by a group of Hungarian academics (ELTE, 
2010), the map of Great Hungary is listed high (3.7 on a 1 to 5 scale) among the items 
which represent Hungary the most and, not surprisingly, the Treaty of Trianon is on the 
top of the list of “Hungary’s historical national tragedies”. School atlases continue to 
reproduce the historical map of Great Hungary, hinting at the natural unity of its space 
(Figure 5). Towns which are now in neighbouring countries continue to be called with 
Hungarian toponyms, as a quick look at road atlases or Wikipedia would reveal. Thus, for 
instance, Bratislava is Pozsony and Cluj-Napoca is Kolozsvár and they are known as such 
by the Hungarian general public. Watching the weather forecast on any of the Hungarian 
state TV channels today can still be a fascinating geopolitical experience, with Great 
Hungary coming into being through weather icons (Figure 6). 
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Although almost a century has passed since Trianon, Great Hungary is still part of 
Hungarians’ memory and imaginary, feeding and being fed by the ‘natural unity’ 
discourse. By briefly surveying the way in which this geopolitical idea has been re-
produced, this editorial has attempted to underline the importance of moving away from 
mainstream geopolitical traditions. This move would not only fulfil the promise of 
critical geopolitics to open up the terrain for ‘other’ voices, but it would also contribute – 
as recently discussed in this journal (Moisio et al., 2011) – to explore the numerous ways 
in which geopolitics can be bended to adapt to specific regional and historical contexts, 
thus exposing its semantic plurality and malleability. 
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Figure 1: Pál Teleki’s ethnography map (also known as ‘Red Map’) 
(Source: Teleki, P. (1920). Magyarország néprajzi térképe a népsűrűség alapján. Budapest: Klösz György 
és Fia Térképészeti Műintézet) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, 3. Remembering Great Hungary 
(Photo by Marco Antonsich) 
 9 
 
 
 10 
 
Figure 4. Pencil case from the interwar period. The print reads ‘no, no, never’ – three 
times ‘no’, as the name ‘Trianon’ was ironically translated by many Hungarians (Photo 
by Marco Antonsich). 
 
 
Figure 5. The ‘natural unity’ of the Carpathian Basin 
(Source: Történelmi Világatlasz, Cartographia Tankönyvkiadó, 2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Great Hungary coming into shape again through the weather forecast on 
Hungary’s state TV channels  
(Source: MTVA) 
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1
 See http://w3.externet.hu/~doborl/fot_newse.htm. This map was originally meant to link Hungary to the 
wave of revolutions which characterized Europe in 1848-49, i.e. a way to symbolize the common European 
heritage. Yet, it triggered the resentful reactions of Romanian, Slovak, and Austrian politicians, who saw in 
the map an attempt to question the Treaty of Trianon. 
